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Intelligence Report

Office of Transnational Issues

20 October 1997

China's Energy Outlook: Continued Heavy Reliance on Coal Likely

Senior Chinese officials have said that China plans to continue relying on its abundant and cheap coal reserves to supply three-quarters of its fast-growing demand for primary energy. Beijing faces resource, infrastructure, and technological constraints in substituting other energy sources for coal use that would increase capital costs and dependence on imported fuels while yielding only modest environmental benefits.

• China has not found sufficient proved reserves of oil or gas to boost their production, and Beijing would have to substantially increase imports to substitute for coal. China already is aggressively exploiting its largest hydroelectric potential, including the Three Gorges Dam, and China is relying heavily on foreign equipment for its few nuclear and renewable energy projects.

Our analysis of two coal substitution scenarios indicates that although China could decrease its dependence on coal by 2015 to about 55 percent of energy demand, coal use nevertheless would double from 1996 levels, assuming an average annual economic growth of 7 percent. Capital costs for new power plants alone would increase by nearly \$140 billion.

- Reductions in annual carbon emissions relative to the baseline case would be 9 and 3 percent, respectively, for aggressive substitution and moderate substitution cases.
- Carbon emissions in 2015 under either scenario would be about 2.5 times what they were in 1996, and China would surpass the United States in annual carbon emission levels.

China's heavy dependence on coal already has caused serious health and environmental problems, and China does not have the technology to reduce coal pollutants.

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- So far, Beijing has done little to combat air pollution problems caused by coal use, and, as a result, respiratory disease from coal pollutants is the leading cause of death in China, according to the World Health Organization.
- China does not have the domestic capability to manufacture clean-coal equipment and has been unwilling to buy foreign pollution-control equipment.

The higher costs for alternative energy sources and Beijing's reluctance to rely on foreign energy sources probably rule out a change in China's energy plans away from heavy coal use in the near term. Chinese attitudes could change, however, if leadership concerns grow about the economic and health costs associated with extensive coal use. Implementation of even a modest coal-substitution plan would require Beijing to change many of its long-standing energy policies, including removal of subsidies on energy prices, easing of restrictions on foreign imports, and stronger environmental laws combined with strict enforcement.


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Heavy Reliance on Coal in Energy Sector

China's economic development has been fueled primarily by coal, and the country relies heavily on its abundant and cheap coal reserves to supply its fast-growing demand for primary energy.

China consumed more than 1.3 billion metric tons of coal in 1996, representing about 75 percent of primary energy consumption. Industry uses almost 600 million metric tons of coal per year, followed by the electric power sector, with more than 400 million metric tons annually, and the residential and commercial sectors, with 200 million metric tons (see figure 1).

- China claims to have more than 1 trillion tons of coal reserves—more than 700 years of consumption at current rates.
- Coal costs less than other fossil fuels in world markets, and price subsidies in China keep coal prices below world levels. For example, in the United States, coal generally costs less than half as much as heavy oil, or about \$7.00 per barrel of oil equivalent (boe), according to the US Department of Energy.



Note: Other includes the transportation and nonspecified sectors.

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China's heavy dependence on coal has caused serious healt problems.	h and environmental
 Respiratory disease from poor control of coal pollutants, cause of death in China, according to the World Health C 	
• China's annual carbon emissions—estimated at more than second only to those of the United States, with nearly 1,5 With an expected growth rate more than four times that will have the world's largest carbon emissions by 2015, a Department of Energy projections.	00 million tons annually. of the United States, China
So far, Beijing has done little to address air pollution probletechnology to manufacture clean-coal technologies and has foreign equipment. If China decides to take more concrete begin a large-scale program to install clean-coal technologies.	s been unwilling to pay for steps, it will either have to

technology to manufacture clean-coal technologies and has be foreign equipment. If China decides to take more concrete ste begin a large-scale program to install clean-coal technologies o substitution of other energy sources.

Constraints to Coal Substitution

Although there are potential coal substitution options for China, each faces resource, infrastructure, and technological constraints.

Oil. China has not found sufficient new reserves to boost stagnating oil production that averaged some, 3.2 million barrels per day (b/d) last year.

Oil

currently supplies nearly 20 percent of primary energy.

- Exploration results in the Tarim Basin-believed by many Western and Chinese geologists to have the country's best potential for large, undiscovered oilfields-have been mixed, and most Western oil companies suspended exploration activity there last year citing poor results and bureaucratic problems, according to press reports.
- Production at China's mature fields in the northeast—Daqing, Shengli, and Liaohe has been stagnant since the late 1980s, and recent press reports indicate that production at Daqing has begun to decline. These fields account for more than 60 percent of the country's total output, or about 2 million b/d.
- Offshore oil production in the East and South China Seas also has been disappointing in the view of many Western industry observers. Output from the South China Sea probably will start to decline in a few years unless new fields are

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found						. Offshore oil produc	tion remains small-
about :	300,000	b/d, or	approx	kima	ely 10 p	percent of total output	
Gas. Ga	as produc	ction pr	obably	v will	continu	ue to grow slowly from	1996 levels of some

Gas. Gas production probably will continue to grow slowly from 1996 levels of some 20 billion cubic meters (bcm). Reported projections of gas consumption to as much as 80 bcm after 2010 almost certainly would require a significant increase in gas imports—by pipeline from the former Soviet Union or as liquefied natural gas (LNG), most likely from Indonesia, Malaysia, or Australia. We estimate that China has some 1,500 bcm of natural gas reserves—in contrast, one Russian gasfield, Urengoi, holds 7,000 bcm of proved reserves. Gas provided about 2 percent of China's primary energy demand in 1996.

- Limited gas reserves, lack of an extensive gas-pipeline infrastructure, and long construction leadtimes hamper gas production and use.
- We have no evidence that China has made any financing arrangements for the numerous gas pipelines and LNG projects that have been reported in the press.

Hydroelectric. According to US Department of Energy studies, China holds large potential hydropower resources—nearly 400 gigawatts (GW)—but most of the country's unexploited resources are far from the country's population centers in the north and east. China's hydroelectric power plants generate about 20 percent of the nation's electricity and provide 6 percent of the country's primary energy.

- China currently has 80,000 hydroelectric power plants, but only one has an installed capacity of more than 2 GW, according to industry statistics. Most of these plants have a capacity of less than 5 megawatts and are not connected to the transmission grid.
- China already is aggressively pursuing its largest hydropower potential, including the 18-GW Three Gorges Dam, which is planned to be on-line by 2010.

Nuclear. Beijing's nascent nuclear power program consists of three units at Qinshan and Daya Bay, with a combined generating capacity of 2 GW-less than 1 percent of China's total installed capacity and primary energy use. China plans for nuclear power plants to be the main alternative to coal-fired plants in the long-term,

with 40 to 50 GW by 2020; however, it will likely be more than 20 years before nuclear power becomes a significant source of electricity because of the high capital costs of the plants, the lack of indigenous manufacturing capability, and the lengthy construction process.

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hina's current nuclear power plants were built with ex and China does not yet have the technology to manufact omponents to build its own nuclear power plants	
China's indigenous pressurized-water reactor program is not likely to develop this technology in the next decade	
newable Energy. Although China has abundant solar, ources, they are located far from demand centers. For gions are in the far western Himalayan Plateau area, who ud-covered. Geothermal resources are located mainly gion, while wind resources are in the western desert and ridor along Inner Mongolia.	example, China's sunny ile central China generally is in the same Himalayan
lectricity generation from renewable energy sources ref China's total electricity generation because of their localities to fossil fuels. The cost of solar-generated and wind-generated electricity	ocations and high costs ity runs about 25 cents and 4
ents per kilowatt hour (kWh), respectively, compared vossil fuels, according to industry sources.	with 1 to 3 cents per kWh for

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
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
Our analysis indicates that while China could decrease its dependence on coal by about 25 percent by 2015 under the most aggressive substitution case, coal use still would almost double from 1996 levels. Capital costs for new power plants alone would increase by nearly \$140 billion in the aggressive substitution scenario and by more than \$30 billion annually in the moderate substitution case (see figure 4)—an increase of 30 percent and 7 percent, respectively, over the baseline case.


- Reductions in annual carbon emission relative to the baseline case would be 9 and 3 percent, respectively, for the aggressive substitution and moderate substitution cases.
- Even so, carbon emissions in 2015 under either scenario would be nearly 2.5 times what they were in 1996.


Aggressive Substitution Case. This case results in about a 25-percent decrease in annual coal use by 2015, with a cumulative savings of 6 percent in carbon emissions from 1997-2015. However, capital costs for new electric power plants increase by almost \$140 billion—or about 30-percent higher than in the baseline case—with another \$25 billion annually needed to offset the additional purchases of oil and gas even with decreased coal purchases.

Coal Substitution Model Results









In this case, China becomes more heavily dependent on oil imports, increased reliance on supplies from the Middle East, and will need tupgrade additional refineries to handle the crude.	~ * .
Expansion of the gas industry costs \$125 billion, mainly for pipeline infrastructure construction, and includes funding for domestic explodevelopment.	
Hydroelectric capacity increases to more than half of China's exploi and China turns increasingly to gas and nuclear power to meet its elegeneration needs.	•
Moderate Substitution Case. This case results in a 7-percent decreasuse by 2015 but only a 2-percent cumulative savings in carbon emissicosts under this scenario increase by more than \$30 billion—about 7 percent in the baseline case—with another \$7 billion annually for increase	ons. Capital ercent higher
China relies more heavily on oil imports than in the baseline case, a Middle East as probably the most important supplier.	gain with the
Some \$90 billion is needed for gas industry development, although pipelines are built.	no international
Reliance on nuclear power increases but to a lesser extent than in the substitution case.	e aggressive
Chinese Policies Make Coal Substitution Difficult	
The higher costs for alternative energy, Beijing's desire to build its over energy technology, and a reluctance to rely on energy imports would for China to exercise even moderate coal substitution in the near term judgment. Chinese attitudes could change, however, if leadership corabout the economic and health costs associated with extensive coal use	make it difficult in our icerns grow
• China's energy policy reflects a strong bias toward least-cost energy using coal, with minimal consideration given to environmental cons	

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• A recent World Bank study put the cost of environmental pollution in China at \$50 billion annually.

Implementing even modest coal substitution would require Beijing to change many of its long-standing energy policies. Key policy changes would include:

- Removal of subsidies on energy prices. A major obstacle to coal substitution would be removed if energy prices were allowed to rise to market levels. In that case, electric power and industrial plant operators would look to the most efficient and flexible way to produce electricity or steam at the lowest overall cost. With prices for coal and gas at free-market levels, gas would become a more viable option for China—in regions such as coastal areas where imported gas could compete with indigenous coal. For example, gas-fired units require less capital costs, are quicker to build, and come on line faster than coal-fired units.
- Fewer government controls on imports and the elimination of taxes on imported energy equipment. Beijing maintains a 15-percent tariff on imported energy equipment and requires foreign suppliers to transfer technology to local manufactures, according to Chinese press reports. Without these market barriers, foreign companies that specialize in energy technologies—including US firms—would be in a better position to encourage alternatives to coal use and gain access to the Chinese market for coal alternatives.
- Stronger environmental laws with strict enforcement. Stronger air pollution laws and stricter enforcement would mean that plant operators would become more conscious about the need to reduce emissions and improve efficiency. In that event, China may advocate more strongly the use of noncoal energy sources such as nuclear and natural gas.

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Clean-Coal Technology Options

Our modeling does not include implementation of clean-coal technology; however, the best opportunity China has to decrease harmful air emissions without using other fuels is to employ clean-coal technologies such as fluidized bed combustion, flue-gas desulfurization, and coal gasification units, according to industry experts—although these technologies do not reduce carbon emissions.²

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	China has little indigenous environmental
	and needs to buy such technology from foreign ntal technology program is about 40 years
	ions centers on improving plant efficiency by 600-MW and 600-MW units—and by retrofitting the majority of capital
	ogy are used to increase energy output through
	al use in China suggest that the country's air ven if clean-coal technologies were used.
,	duce emissions per unit of coal burned, the pal consumption would raise sulfur dioxide 994 to 25-30 million tons in 2020.
China's carbon emissions to 1,700-1	2020, increased coal consumption will push 1,900 million tons or to 25 percent of the world's ited States as the world's largest carbon emitter.

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